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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates whether job offers arrive more frequently for those in 
employment than for those in unemployment. To this end, we take advantage of a unique 
Australian data set which contains information on both accepted and rejected job offers. 
Our estimation strategy takes account of the selectivity associated with the initial 
employment state and we allow for individual heterogeneity in the probability of 
obtaining jobs. Our results reveal that, across the wage range, individuals are about 
equally likely to obtain a job offer in employment as in unemployment.  This implies that 
encouraging unemployed (rather than employed) search through the provision of 
unemployment benefits does not improve the speed of a job match. 
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1 Introduction
Who receives more acceptable job oﬀers, the unemployed or the employed? Answering this
question is important for several reasons. First, if unemployed search is more eﬀective than
employed search a case can be made that risk aversion amongst the unemployed or externalities
in the search process warrant the subsidising of unemployment. The argument — made at least
as early as Burdett (1979) — is that if job oﬀers in employment arrive infrequently then an
initial ‘bad choice’ cannot be easily corrected resulting in less eﬃcient outcomes. Marimon
and Zilibotti (1999), for example, argue that individuals who accept unsuitable jobs reduce
the availability of such jobs for others who are better suited. Consequently, bad job matches
made by the unemployed out of financial necessity should be avoided. These views have
led many to advocate using unemployment benefits to subsidise unemployed job search as a
means of increasing eﬃciency in the labour market (for example, Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999;
Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999).
At the same time, if the employed receive at least as many job oﬀers as the unemployed,
then arguments in favour of unemployment benefits as a search subsidy become less valid.
Indeed, if job oﬀers arrive more frequently during employment then subsidising unemployment
may lead to higher unemployment levels and be counterproductive.
Second, there are also theoretical reasons to be concerned about relative job-oﬀer arrival
rates. Assumptions about the relative frequency of job oﬀers during employment and unemploy-
ment form a key component of many job search models. The standard Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) model of wage heterogeneity amongst homogeneous individuals presumes for example
that employed and unemployed job-oﬀer arrival rates are the same. Empirical applications of
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this model, such as in Bontemps et al. (2000) depend upon the plausibility of this assumption
as does the theoretical framework in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). On the other hand, Van
den Berg (1990), Frijters and Van der Klaauw (2001), and Flinn and Heckman (1982) assume
that the job-oﬀer arrival rate for the employed is zero and applications of these models rest
heavily on this assumption.
Despite the importance of the issue, the empirical evidence is limited. Early results for US
youth suggest that search intensity is higher in unemployment than in employment, resulting
in more job oﬀers while unemployed, although the estimated wage returns to unemployed
search are not necessarily higher (see Kahn and Low, 1982; 1984; Holzer, 1987). At the same
time, employed search is significantly more eﬃcient than unemployed search for Dutch students
(Van der Klaauw et al., 2004), while Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) show that twice as many
workers in the UK choose on-the-job search rather than quitting into full-time search, indicating
that workers themselves see a relative benefit in searching on the job. Moreover, Jackman et
al. (1989) argue that in the UK the eﬃciency of job search by the unemployed declined relative
to the eﬃciency of employed job search in the decades leading up to 1989.
Our objective is to shed new light on these issues by investigating whether ‘acceptable’
job oﬀers occur more frequently in employment than in unemployment. To this end, we take
advantage of a large panel survey of relatively disadvantaged job seekers in Australia who —
while not necessarily representative of labour market participants as a whole — are most directly
the focus of public policies targeting the unemployed. We avoid the selectivity associated
with initial employment state by utilising information on rejected job oﬀers for individuals
who are observed searching for jobs both in employment and in unemployment. Using this
identification strategy, we then non-parametrically estimate separate employed and unemployed
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wage-oﬀer distributions. Unlike alternative data sources, our data provide information over
a period of three years about monthly (as opposed to annual) job oﬀers, the beginning and
end dates of both employed and unemployed search spells, and annual reports of reservation
wages. Detailed information about search outcomes (including rejected job oﬀers) for large
samples of employed and unemployed job seekers is fairly uncommon and allows us to account
for selectivity associated with initial employment state as well as the endogeneity of search
eﬀort.
Our results are robust across a number of specifications and indicate that the intensity and
eﬃciency of search is slightly lower in employment than in unemployment. However, oﬀer
arrival rates do not diﬀer significantly implying that employed and unemployed job seekers in
Australia are essentially equally likely to receive acceptable job oﬀers. Although diﬀerences
in estimation samples and empirical methods make direct comparisons diﬃcult, our results
fall between previous results from Northern Europe which indicate that the unemployed are
less likely to receive job oﬀers and US evidence which suggests that unemployed job search is
perhaps more eﬃcient than employed search.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we set out our theoretical
framework and derive our estimation equations. In Section 3, we describe the data and focus
on the unconditional ratio of employed to unemployed job-oﬀer arrival rates. Following that, we
present our estimation results paying particular attention to placing our results in the context
of the wider international literature. Conclusions are given in Section 5.
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2 The Institutional Setting
Unlike in many other countries, unemployment benefits in Australia are funded from general
tax revenues and form one component of the wider income-support system. Unemployment
insurance — in which eligibility is based on former employment and benefits levels are linked to
previous earnings — is not available. Consequently, benefit levels are driven only by a house-
hold’s composition, income, and assets (excluding the family home). Moreover, benefits are
available for an unlimited period, although recipients must be actively searching for employment
in order to qualify.1
Over our period of analysis, Australian unemployment ranged between 9.0 per cent in
September 1994 to 8.2 per cent in September 1997. Unemployment was at its lowest in July
1995 at 7.5 per cent, but was concentrated around 8 per cent for much of the period. Over
this period, Australian unemployment benefits provided a basic income level for eligible re-
cipients. In particular, single individuals could receive a maximum unemployment benefit of
$320 per fortnight in early 1997, while individuals in couple families could receive up to $290
per fortnight.2 After a small earnings allowance — approximately $60 per fortnight for single
individuals — taper rates of between 50 and 70 per cent applied. Benefit entitlement completely
ended once individuals earned between $500 (individuals in a couple families) and $540 (single
individuals) per fortnight.
1Sole parents with children under the age of 16 are entitled to a sole parent pension which does not require
that recipients acitvely engage in job search.
2In comparison, full-time average earnings were on average $694.10 in February 1997, while average earnings
were $581.60 (ABS, 2004: Table 3 Average Weekly Earnings Of Employees, Australia (Dollars) - Original).
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3 The Model
3.1 Theoretical Framework
Our goal is to develop a theoretical framework which captures the essence of the job search
process, exploits the relative strengths of our data (see the discussion below), and provides
a sensible backdrop against which to interpret our results. To this end, we develop a semi-
structural model which allows us to deal with the selectivity of those in employment, fixed-eﬀects
in wage-oﬀer distributions, and unobserved heterogeneity in job-oﬀer arrival rates.
We begin by taking a simplified stationary job-search environment in which individuals
undertake directed (or systematic) search in order to find jobs (see for example, Kahn and
Low, 1988; 1990; Gregg and Petrongolo, 2000). While undirected (or random) search would
result in job oﬀers periodically arriving from randomly encountered employers, directed search
implies that an unemployed individual i only applies for jobs that pay a wage higher than or
equal to his or her individual-specific reservation wage ( w˘i). Empirical evidence suggests that
directed search is quite common (Kahn and Low, 1988; 1990). Moreover, a directed search
framework seems reasonable given the self-reported nature of job oﬀers in our data. In fact,
nearly all unemployed job seekers have latent job oﬀers to become self-employed street vendors
or floor sweepers at the nearest fast-food restaurant. These latent, low-paid job oﬀers are clearly
not what people mean when they report to have had a job oﬀer. Reported job oﬀers are in
some sense ‘serious’ oﬀers, and hence better fit a directed search view of the labour market.
As an illustration, the search process for a sample of job seekers who are initially unemployed
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is outlined in Figure 1.3
Figure 1: The Stocks of Individuals in the Sample
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In each period, individuals are assumed to have an individual-specific job-oﬀer arrival rate λi.
An observed job oﬀer for an unemployed individual consists of a relative wage oﬀer drawn from
a distribution FUN( ww˘i ) where w is the oﬀered wage and w˘i is the individual-specific reservation
wage. In other words, the probability of obtaining a specific wage oﬀer w depends on the
level of that wage oﬀer relative to the individual’s reservation wage. Our directed search
framework implies that FUN( ww˘i ) = 0 for
w
w˘i
< 1.4 Job oﬀers are assumed to be rejected with
an exogenous probability γ because, for example, the non-monetary aspects of the job turn out
to be unsatisfactory or family circumstances prevent a change of job.5
At the start of the next period, individuals make a new decision to either continue or to end
their job search. In particular, some individuals who are initially unemployed will receive and
3Some individuals engaged in unemployed search may have been employed in previous periods, while others
may never have been employed.
4In Section 5 we discuss the extent to which this assumption holds in our sample.
5In particular, Devine and Kiefer (1991) note that diﬀerences in job search outcomes are mainly due to
diﬀerences in arrival rates rather than to diﬀerences in the probability of rejecting oﬀers. We consider the
robustness of our results to this assumption in the results section.
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accept a job oﬀer, but continue their job search while employed. An employed job seeker is as-
sumed to obtain job oﬀers with arrival rate λi∗δ from a distribution FE( ww˘i ). Disparity between
FE( ww˘i ) and F
UN( ww˘i ) stems from the possibility that the job pools to which individuals have
access may depend on their employment status, while we can think of δ as capturing the relative
search intensity of employed individuals in comparison to their unemployed counterparts.
This theoretical framework is useful in that it allows us to focus directly on the eﬀectiveness
of directed employed and unemployed job search. An obvious alternative to this approach,
would be to capture diﬀerences in employed and unemployed job search by allowing the reser-
vation wage itself to depend on whether an individual is currently employed or unemployed (as
in Frijters and Kalb, 2003). Our preliminary estimation, however, suggests that individuals’
reservation wages do not change substantially when they either gain or lose jobs (see Appendix
Table A.1). Similarly, we also do not observe significant wage increases as a result of job
changes. These findings most likely stem from the fact that our sample is dominated by low-
skilled individuals for whom the main reason to change jobs is related to travel, family, and
job security considerations. Given this, we model reservation wages as individual-specific and
independent of current employment status.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
We are interested in estimating whether job oﬀers occur more frequently in employment than
in unemployment. The theoretical framework outlined in Section 3.1 suggests that the relative
frequency of job oﬀers is a function of both relative search intensity in the two labour market
states (δ) and divergence in wage oﬀer distributions (FE( ww˘i ) and F
UN( ww˘i )). Consequently,
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our empirical strategy centres around estimating the relative arrival rate of jobs that pay at
least ww˘i in employment versus unemployment which we denote as R(
w
w˘i
). Specifically,
R(
w
w˘i
) = δ(1− FE( w
w˘i
))/(1− FUN( w
w˘i
)) (1)
where equation (1) can be evaluated across the range of relative wage oﬀers ( ww˘i ).
Various econometric issues need to be addressed in the estimation of equation (1). We begin
by considering the potential selectivity associated with initial employment state. When our
data window opens, our sample of job seekers will include some individuals who are currently
unemployed and some individuals who were initially unemployed, but then accepted a job
oﬀer and chose to continue to search while employed.6 The diﬃculty is that individuals
observed in jobs at the start of the data period are not a random sample of all job seekers
as those individuals with extremely low λi are less likely to be observed in employment than
those with high λi. In eﬀect, initial employment state is likely to be correlated with a job
seeker’s individual-specific probability of receiving a wage oﬀer. The extent to which this
might result in biased estimates is an empirical question. Kahn and Low (1982) find, for
example, that estimates correcting for the selectivity bias associated with initial employment
state suggest that unemployed job seekers receive more oﬀers than employed job seekers do,
though uncorrected results demonstrate the opposite. In order to circumvent this potential
initial conditions problem, we restrict the estimation sample to those individuals whom we
observe both in employment and unemployment over the data period. We can then compare the
search intensity of individuals in employment with their own search intensity in unemployment.
6These are groups B1 and B5 respectively in Figure 1.
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This sample restriction — while useful in dealing with unobserved heterogeneity — makes
it diﬃcult to generate estimates of the unconditional, relative search eﬃciency in employment
versus unemployment across the entire sample of job seekers. In eﬀect, the sample support
includes only those individuals who have received at least one acceptable job oﬀer whilst un-
employed. Without additional structure regarding the relationship between employment state
and individual heterogeneity in job-oﬀer arrival rates (λi) it would be diﬃcult to recover un-
conditional estimates of R( ww˘i ) from this restricted sample if we were to base the estimation on
accepted job oﬀers.
Consequently, we adopt a multi-step estimation strategy. We first estimate the relative
intensity of employed versus unemployed search (δ) disregarding accepted job oﬀers and instead
using only data on the arrival rate of rejected job oﬀers in employment versus unemployment.
Rejected job oﬀers do not suﬀer from the same truncation problem (as accepted oﬀers would)
because the sample selection rule we have imposed is not based on rejected job oﬀers.7
More specifically, rejected job oﬀers arrive at a rate eλi = γλi for the unemployed and a
rate δeλi = δγλi for the employed. For each individual i we observe a sequence {di1, .., diT}
whereby di1 is an indicator function for the existence of a rejected job oﬀer in period t = {1...T}.
Here, time runs only over those periods in which an individual reports active job search and
may hence contain disjoint periods. The set of relevant time periods is denoted as Si. For
each individual, we also define a sequence of indicators {Ei1, .., EiT} that denote whether an
individual is in employment or not.
7In eﬀect, δ and λi are estimated simultaneously by using the restricted sample to compare the likelihood
that individuals in unemployed search (B1) will reject a wage oﬀer (i.e., move to B3) in comparison to the
likelihood that individuals engaged in employed search (B5) will reject a wage oﬀer (i.e., move to B7). See
Figure 1.
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We use maximum likelihood estimation to generate an estimate of the relative intensity of
employed versus unemployed search, δ. The likelihood of the observed sequence of rejected job
oﬀers in terms of the model parameters is given by
Li =
Z ÃY
t∈Si
³eλiδEit´dit ³1− eλiδEit´1−dit! dG(eλi) (2)
where G(eλi) denotes the distribution of eλi.8 This likelihood is integrated over the distribution
of possible job-oﬀer arrival rates, G(eλi) for both employed and unemployed individuals and the
integral should be read in the Lebesque sense.9 We thus allow for heterogeneity in the rejected
job-oﬀer arrival rate through our choice of distributions for eλi (see Section 4).10
In the second step, we use information regarding accepted wage oﬀers to identify the wage-
oﬀer distributions FE( ww˘i ) and F
UN( ww˘i ) assuming that reservation wages are individual-specific
and stationary over time.11 Basing the estimation on accepted wage oﬀers does not generate a
sample selection problem, because any wage oﬀer exceeding the reservation wage is assumed to
8To see this note that for the unemployed Eit = 0 and the likelihood becomesR  Y
t∈Si\Eit=1
³eλi´dit ³1− eλi´1−dit

 dG(eλi) where eλi is the probability of observing a rejected job oﬀer
and
³
1− eλi´ is the probability of not observing a rejected job oﬀer. For employed individuals, however,
Eit = 1 and the likelihood becomes
R  Y
t∈Si\Eit=0
³eλiδ´dit ³1− eλiδ´1−dit

 dG(eλi) where eλiδ is the probability
of observing a rejected job oﬀer and
³
1− eλiδ´ is the probability of not observing a rejected job oﬀer.
9This implies that whenG(.) is a discrete distribution, the integral becomes a simple sum over all mass-points.
10In particular, we use both discrete mass-point and lognormal distributions to approximate the distribution
of eλi.
11In eﬀect, FE( ww˘i ) is estimated from the wage oﬀers received by the sample of job seekers in B6, while
FUN ( ww˘i ) is estimated using the wages oﬀers of individuals in B2. (See Figure 1.)
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be rejected with an exogenous probability γ. This leads wage oﬀers to be independent of the
probability that serious wage oﬀers (i.e., those exceeding the reservation wage) will be accepted
implying that the sample selection rule is independent of the outcome of interest. Estimated
wage distributions FˆE( ww˘i ) and Fˆ
UN( ww˘i ) are computed non-parametrically by taking fˆ
E( ww˘i )
and fˆUN( ww˘i ) to be piece-wise constant.
Using estimates derived in these two steps, we then construct our measure of the relative
arrival rate of acceptable job oﬀers, R( ww˘i ), given in equation (1). Specifically,
Rˆ(w) = δˆ(1− FˆE( w
w˘i
))/(1− FˆUN( w
w˘i
)). (3)
We can only derive a lower bound for the error in this estimate of R( ww˘i ). Specifically, the error
is at least as high as that caused by the uncertainty in δˆ and by the finite-sample uncertainty
in FˆE( ww˘i ) and Fˆ
UN( ww˘i ). To be more precise regarding the finite-sample uncertainty in Fˆ
E( ww˘i )
and FˆUN( ww˘i ), suppose n1 out of N individuals accepted a wage higher than a certain
w∗
w˘i
during
employment. Standard asymptotic distribution theory then tells us that
Std.Error
·
FˆUN(
w∗
w˘i
)
¸
=
q
n1
N ∗
N−n1
N√
N
. (4)
Confidence intervals can be constructed for Rˆ by means of bootstrapping from the separately
estimated confidence intervals around δˆ and FˆE( ww˘i ) and Fˆ
UN( ww˘i ).
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4 Survey of Employment and Unemployment Patterns
We utilise data derived from the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (ABS) Survey of Employment
and Unemployment Patterns (SEUP), which detail the work and job-seeking experiences of
individuals over the three-year period 1994 - 1997.12 The public use sample includes 7572
respondents, the majority of whom were either actively seeking work or likely to be entering the
labour market at the time of recruitment.13 Consequently, our focus is on the job-oﬀer arrival
rates of a relatively homogenous, disadvantaged group at risk of unemployment. Given our
interest in understanding the nexus between job oﬀers, reservation wages, and search behaviour,
we have excluded full-time students, family workers and self-employed individuals from the
sample, so that 5223 individuals remain.14 The SEUP data can be combined to form sequences
of work and non-work spells. Periods of job search are also recorded so that a job search
indicator can be constructed for each work/non-work spell. Of the 2315 individuals who are
observed to engage in job search at some point in the period, we selected the 1577 individuals
who are observed in both employment and unemployment. These individuals constitute our
estimation sample.
12The SEUP sampling frame consists of three separate random samples from the wider Australian population
aged 15 to 59 residing in private dwellings: 1) individuals seeking jobs; 2) a population reference group; and 3)
individuals participating in a labour market program. The public-use data include information about the first
two samples only and consequently, individuals participating in labour market programs have been excluded
from the analysis. For more detailed information about the SEUP data see ABS, (1997; 1998).
13The job seeker group comprises those who, at the time of recruitment (April-June 1995), were: unemployed,
underemployed (working less than ten hours per week and looking for a job with more hours), discouraged from
job search or not in the labour force but likely to enter the labour force in the near future. Thus this group is
sampled from a stock of unemployed/underemployed individuals rather than the inflow of unemployed and as
a result they are selected to be more disadvantaged than the average person entering unemployment.
14Full-time students are excluded because for them full-time study provides an additional alternative to work
and non-work. Self-employed individuals and family workers are excluded because a participation decision
based on reservation and market wages is not relevant for them in the same way as it is for wage and salary
earners.
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For each of the work spells identified in the SEUP data, job information such as earnings,
hours of work, occupation and industry is available. Wage-related information in the data
includes reservation wages for all individuals seeking work (independent of their current em-
ployment status), acceptance wages in new jobs that occur after a non-working spell, and wages
in current jobs.15 Finally, individuals seeking work reported the timing of any job oﬀers along
with an indication of whether the oﬀer had been accepted or rejected.
This information is used to construct the main variables of interest. In particular, we
constructed a monthly indicator variable for the arrival of at least one job oﬀer as well as
indicators of whether specific job oﬀers were accepted or not. We also constructed a measure of
acceptance wages. This information is directly reported for new jobs that follow a spell of non-
work. For new jobs that follow employment spells, the acceptance wage equals the first reported
wage after the new job begins. In both cases, we replaced the relevant categorical wage with
a prediction based on all available individual information (including, for example, education,
occupation, hours of work and experience) and the reported wage category. Similarly, we
constructed individual reservation wages by estimating a model of reservation wages (including
fixed individual-specific eﬀects), and calculating a predicted reservation wage for individuals
who have just become unemployed (see Table A1).16
In order to highlight the underlying patterns in the data, summary statistics for the main
variables of interest are given in Table 1 by gender, employment status, job-search status and
disability status. Additionally, job-oﬀer arrival rates are shown for individuals who are out of
15SEUP wage information is reported categorically.
16Specifically, each individual is assigned the expected value from his or her predicted wage distribution
conditional on the reported wage interval. Hourly wages were asked in 29 brackets; reservation wages in 30
brackets. This makes the predicted (reservation) wages extremely close to actual (reservation) wages: the
margin for error is less than 2 per cent when one takes predictions within each bracket.
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the labour market or who are employed and not actively seeking employment. Interestingly,
the raw data reveal only slight diﬀerences in job-oﬀer arrival rates between employed and
unemployed job seekers. While the employed who are searching for new jobs receive an oﬀer
every 151 days on average, the unemployed receive job oﬀers every 141 days. There also
appears to be little diﬀerence in job-oﬀer arrival rates for unemployed men and women. On
average, unemployed men in the sample receive a job oﬀer every 179 days, while unemployed
women receive job oﬀers on average every 167 days. The gender gap in oﬀer arrival rates
amongst the employed is even smaller.
Table 1: Summary Statistics for the Dependent Variables
Actual Reserv. Reserv. Reserv. Job Oﬀers. Expected
Wage Wage 1 Wage 2 Wage 3 Per Day Days Before
an Oﬀer
not in employment 11.06 10.82 11.15 0.0058 172
by labour market status
out of the labour force 0.0032 312
unemployed 11.06 10.82 11.15 0.0071 141
by gender
men 11.54 10.82 11.35 0.0056 179
women 10.60 10.82 10.90 0.0060 167
by disability status
yes 11.09 10.94 11.06 0.0047 213
no 11.04 10.77 11.21 0.0064 156
in employment 13.73 11.39 11.33 11.97 0.0038 263
by labour market status
work, no search 13.69 0.0026 385
work and search 13.85 11.39 11.33 11.97 0.0066 151
by gender
man 13.99 12.34 11.64 12.49 0.0037 270
woman 13.46 10.50 10.99 11.41 0.0038 263
number of obs. 7852 1102 2740 2493 18257 18257
Moreover, the reservation wages of employed searchers ($11.39 in the first job) are slightly
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higher than for unemployed searchers ($11.06), but the diﬀerence is small. Men have both
higher reservation wages and higher actual wages than women. The wages of those who continue
searching while employed and those who stop searching are also essentially the same which most
likely stems from the similarities in the demographic and human capital characteristics of the
employed and unemployed job seekers in our sample (see Table 2). In particular, although
employed job seekers have somewhat more human capital than their unemployed counterparts,
these diﬀerences are in general quite modest.
5 Results
Our goal is to estimate whether employed or unemployed job search is relatively more eﬀective
in producing acceptable wage oﬀers for low-skilled individuals. If employed search is at least as
eﬀective as unemployed search, then arguments that unemployed job search should be subsidized
through the provision of unemployment benefits become less valid. If, in fact, low-skilled
individuals are more likely to receive job oﬀers whilst employed then policies which view part-
time or casual employment as stepping stones to longer-term employment stability may be
preferred. The theoretical framework outlined in Section 3 leads us to have a preference for
estimating the relative arrival rate of acceptable job oﬀers — see equation (1) — using information
on rejected wage oﬀers from the subsample of job seekers who are observed to engage in both
employed and unemployed job search at some point in the data period. In this section we
discuss the results from this estimation procedure and consider how robust these results are to
the various assumptions we have made.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Job Seekers by Employment Status
Total Job Seekers Unemployed Employed
Job Seekers Job Seekers
Demographic Characteristics Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
female 0.447 0.497 0.446 0.497 0.450 0.498
age 35.753 10.801 35.901 10.920 35.396 10.501
partnered 0.556 0.497 0.557 0.497 0.556 0.497
number of children 0.774 1.096 0.783 1.101 0.751 1.084
Youngest child is:
aged 0 0.051 0.219 0.052 0.222 0.048 0.213
aged 1 to 2 0.081 0.272 0.085 0.279 0.070 0.255
aged 3 to 5 0.095 0.293 0.094 0.292 0.097 0.296
aged over 5 0.126 0.332 0.126 0.332 0.127 0.333
Australian born 0.730 0.444 0.715 0.451 0.764 0.424
Human Capital Characteristics
Years of job search since school 2.759 3.119 2.893 3.171 2.436 2.965
Disabled 0.318 0.466 0.330 0.470 0.290 0.454
English is spoken at home 0.902 0.298 0.889 0.314 0.932 0.252
Education
higher degree/post-doctoral 0.019 0.136 0.018 0.131 0.022 0.148
bachelors degree 0.070 0.255 0.060 0.238 0.093 0.290
undergraduate diploma 0.059 0.237 0.058 0.234 0.062 0.242
skilled vocational qualification 0.168 0.374 0.167 0.373 0.172 0.378
basic vocational qualification 0.063 0.243 0.063 0.243 0.064 0.245
finished secondary school 0.174 0.379 0.170 0.376 0.181 0.385
left secondary aged 16-18 0.199 0.399 0.205 0.404 0.183 0.387
left secondary aged less than 15 0.248 0.432 0.259 0.438 0.222 0.416
Part-time student 0.074 0.262 0.070 0.255 0.085 0.279
Work experience in years 13.432 11.039 13.358 11.130 13.610 10.817
Number of observations 9599 6781 2818
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5.1 Job Search Eﬀectiveness
The likelihood function we are seeking to maximise is given in equation (2). Several alternative
specifications can be used to approximate the distribution of the arrival rate of rejected job
oﬀers across individuals, G(eλi). The most flexible possibility is to take a discrete distribution
for G(eλi) with K points of support. In other words, we assume that
P [eλi = exiβθk|xi] = pk
1 ≥ pk ≥ 0
1 > θk > 0
KX
k=1
pk = 1
which for large K can approach any distribution function. This framework allows us to consider
both observed heterogeneity in the demographic and human capital characteristics (xi) and un-
observed heterogeneity (θk ) of job seekers which are assumed to be independent. Specifically,
we can accommodate unobserved heterogeneity in the model by allowing K to be relatively
large. We estimated the model using a range of values for K including K=20, K=5, K=3, and
K=2 and found that in all cases there was convergence towards a single point of support sug-
gesting that our sample of low-skilled job seekers exhibits very little unobserved heterogeneity
in rejected oﬀer arrival rates (eλi).17 Moreover, we adopted a lognormal distribution (with a
17We validated the program by testing it on artificial data where we chose an equal number of observations
(persons and months) as in the actual data, and we simulated job-oﬀers given a particular distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity. We ran separate simulations for the unobserved heterogeneity with 2 and 5 points
of support, all with equal mass-weight, δ = 1, geometrically spaced hazard rates (a factor of 2 between each
successive point), and N=1577. There were no convergence problems and the estimates were all within one per
17
mid-point of θ and a standard deviation of σθ) for eλi In all cases, we found σθ converged to
0, again indicating a lack of unobserved heterogeneity.18 Consequently, we use a proportional
hazard model to estimate equation (2) using information on rejected wage oﬀers for the sam-
ple of individuals observed to have at least one spell of employed job search within our data
window. The results (coeﬃcients and t-statistics) are presented in the first column of Table 3.
Table 3: Proportional Hazard Estimation Results for
Job-oﬀer Arrival Rates G(eλi), and Relative Search Intensity δ
Observed in unemployment and employment All job seekers all periods
rejected job oﬀers rejected job oﬀers only All job oﬀers
Variables coef. t-val coef. t-val coef. t-val
ln(constant) -2.37 25.8 -2.331 29.9 -1.798 34.4
Part-time study 0.011 0.1 0.016 0.6 0.008 0.5
Number of kids -0.006 0.2 -0.017 0.8 -0.031 2.0
Having a disability -0.033 1.3 -0.028 1.3 -0.039 2.6
Presence of partner 0.010 0.3 0.025 1.1 0.018 1.1
Age at start of the sample -0.104 3.9 -0.097 4.4 -0.089 5.9
Living outside a city -0.054 2.1 -0.053 2.5 -0.024 1.7
δ 0.811 3.2* 0.854 2.9* 0.663 10.5*
N 1247 1577 2314
Average Likelihood -5.85276 −6.25752 −7.87193
*The t-value on δ refers to the H0 of δ = 1.
What do these results tell us about rejected job-oﬀer arrival rates for employed and unem-
ployed job seekers? First, it is interesting that there is little evidence of heterogeneity in arrival
cent of the actual values.
18The lack of unobserved heterogeneity results from a hazard rate of obtaining a (rejected) job-oﬀer that is
relatively constant over time. In other words, the data do not suggest that over time the sample of those who
have not yet received a wage oﬀer becomes more selective with respect to the individual-specific oﬀer arrival
rate. Specifically, the hazard does not decline over time and if anything slightly increases which does not support
the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
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rates. In part, this may stem from the fact that our sample includes relatively homogenous job
seekers with limited labour market prospects. In fact, the predicted arrival rate of rejected job
oﬀers is only once every 15 months, while the arrival rate of accepted job oﬀers is once every
9.5 months.19
More importantly, the relative intensity of employed versus unemployed search (δˆ) is es-
timated to be 0.811 with a 95 per cent confidence interval of [0.685,0.961]. This confidence
interval does not quite include 1 indicating that for the low-skilled job seekers in our sample the
intensity of job search is lower in employment than in unemployment. Moreover, the results
indicate that it is older job seekers and those living outside a city centre who are significantly
less like to get (rejected) job oﬀers.
These estimates based on rejected wage oﬀers have the advantage that — if rejection rates
are exogenous and do not depend on employment state — we can deal with any unobserved
heterogeneity by restricting the sample to those individuals observed both in employed and
unemployed job search, while still recovering unconditional estimates of the oﬀer arrival rate.
The diﬃculty is that the propensity to reject a job oﬀer may in fact depend on whether one
is employed or unemployed. To test the robustness of our results to this assumption, we also
compare the results from the preferred specification with the results from proportional hazard
models when we do not condition on observing at least one employed search spell, and when
we use both rejected and accepted job oﬀers (see Table 3 columns 2 and 3). These estimates
19Homogeneity in arrival rates also reflects the fact that we focus on self-reported, rejected job oﬀers in
a directed search environment. This implies that the results do not include the usual individual-specific
heterogeneity in the arrival rate of job oﬀers with an absolute wage w. It is certainly the case that some
individuals are more likely to receive a high-wage job oﬀer than are others. However in this framework,
reported job oﬀers for diﬀerent individuals are not constrained to coming from the same wage distribution.
Therefore, in this model individual-specific heterogeneity is captured in the disparity in reservation wages.
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do not require us to make the strong and possibly invalid assumption that rejection rates are
not dependent on employment status.
The relative intensity of employed versus unemployed search (δˆ) is estimated to be 0.663
when we use information about all job oﬀers indicating that search intensity is significantly
lower in employment than in unemployment. This estimate of δ is slightly lower than when we
only use rejected job oﬀers which reflects either the fact that the employed are less likely than
the unemployed to reject job oﬀers or that there are sample selection eﬀects. The hypothesis
that the estimate of the relative search intensity (δ) is the same in both cases cannot be rejected
at the 95 per cent confidence interval, however. We also considered whether deleting individuals
who never got a job oﬀer (less than 2 per cent of the sample) aﬀected the estimated intensity of
employed versus unemployed search and found similar results (the point estimate of δ was 0.855
in that case). Our overall conclusion that the intensity of search for low-skilled job seekers is
slightly lower in employment than in unemployment is unaﬀected by whether we use all wage
oﬀers or only rejected wage oﬀers and the sample we choose.
5.2 Job-oﬀer Arrival Rates
These results tell us about the relative eﬀectiveness or intensity of job search by employment
status. In order to understand how the frequency of job oﬀers varies with employment status,
however, we also need to focus on the nature of the job-oﬀer wage distributions themselves. In
Figure 2, the estimated wage distributions FˆE( ww˘i ) and Fˆ
UN( ww˘i ) are presented along with the
estimated relative arrival rate of jobs that pay at least ww˘i in employment versus unemployment
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(Rˆ(w)).20 The first thing to note is that — although theory predicts that individuals will not
Figure 2: Distribution of Accepted Wages Relative to Reservation
Wages and Implied Relative Job-oﬀer Arrival Rate
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accept wages lower than their reservation wages — observed wages are higher than reported
reservation wages in only 94 per cent of cases. This finding is consistent with other empirical
evidence and may indicate the presence of measurement error in actual and/or reservation
wages.21
Figure 2 also demonstrates that the estimated distributions FˆE( ww˘i ) and Fˆ
UN( ww˘i ) are very
close. Most importantly, FˆE( ww˘i ) does not stochastically dominate Fˆ
UN( ww˘i ), suggesting that
20The estimates of Rˆ(w) are based on our prefered specification in column 1 of Table 3.
21Holzer (1987), for example, finds for the US that on average the hourly wages of oﬀers accepted by the
employed are less than the average reservation wages amongst those employed individuals with job oﬀers.
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low-skilled job seekers are not able to use their employment base to generate more acceptable
wage oﬀers. Indeed, only in the region 1.4 < ww˘i < 1.6 are the two distributions significantly
diﬀerent at the 95 per cent confidence level. In that range, oﬀered wages are clearly higher
in employment, as might be expected if employment itself oﬀered access to other employment
opportunities. Over much of the range, however, there is little diﬀerence in the wages oﬀered to
employed and unemployed job seekers. In part, this may reflect the fact that many individuals
in our sample who search while employed have unattractive or insecure jobs and hence do not
necessarily search for higher paying jobs.
Finally, we discuss the point estimates for R( ww˘i ). The most important aspect of this graph
is that across most of the relevant wage range, the point estimates of R( ww˘i ) are approximately
the same as δˆ indicating that (1− FˆE( ww˘i ))/(1− Fˆ
UN( ww˘i )) ≈ 1. The standard deviation of Rˆ
is about 0.2 implying that job oﬀers in employment are slightly though not significantly higher
than in unemployment. Most importantly, across the entire range of possible values for ww˘i it
is the case that Rˆ( ww˘i ) is not significantly diﬀerent from 1 at the 90 per cent confidence level.
Its point estimate for the mid-point of the FˆE( ww˘i ) distribution (when
w
w˘i
≈ 1.91) is 0.95 which
is very close to 1. Consequently, the overarching conclusion from this analysis is that there
is no evidence for diﬀerential job-oﬀer probabilities in employment versus unemployment, with
the point estimate being a diﬀerential of no more than 15 per cent.
5.3 Discussion
In Australia, the probability of receiving a job oﬀer is largely independent of current employment
status. Consequently, searching while unemployed does not generate an eﬃciency gain for the
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economy as a whole through a quicker matching of vacancies and job searchers. In this respect
the Australian labour market falls between that of Northern Europe, where the unemployed
are less likely to obtain job oﬀers than are the employed22, and the United States where the
unemployed seem more able than the employed to search for new jobs.23
It is diﬃcult to know whether these disparities in research findings stem from diﬀerences in
the institutional arrangements for administering unemployment benefits or from the specifics
of the data sample, analysis period, and estimation strategy. Results based upon a group of
disadvantaged job seekers looking for work in a period of relatively high unemployment may
not readily translate to other groups operating under other labour market conditions. At the
same time, diﬀerences across countries in the relative eﬃciency of employed versus unemployed
search are likely to be due in part to institutional diﬀerences. In Australia, unlike many
other countries, unemployment benefits are non-contributory, funded from general revenue,
and comprise one component of a broader system of income-support payments administered by
the Australian government. Payment levels are uniform across the country, do not depend on
previous work history, and are not time limited. This stands in sharp contrast to the social
insurance model operating in the United States. Moreover the easier dismissal procedures in the
United States — which might make employers less reluctant to employ people who are currently
unemployed (i.e. employers are more prone to ignore the signalling aspect of unemployment in
cases where dismissal is easier) — may also play a role. Finally, it is also possible that there are
equilibrium eﬀects driving this diﬀerence. In particular, it is possible that to be a (short-term)
22Some evidence for this is found by Boeri (1999). He shows that an increase of workers on short-term jobs,
who are likely to be on-the-job searchers, reduces the flow from unemployment to employment using information
from a number of countries. See also Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) and Jackman, et al. (1989).
23See an overview of a few articles in Devine and Kiefer (1991: pp. 254-255).
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unemployed individual searching for a job is not taken to be a bad signal in the United States
whereas it is in Australia and Europe.
6 Conclusions
The relationship between current employment status and the eﬃciency of job search has im-
plications for theoretical models of job search behaviour and for public policies targeting the
unemployed. If unemployed search is more eﬀective than employed search, a case can be made
that subsidising unemployment may improve labour market eﬃciency. At the same time, if the
employed receive at least as many job oﬀers as the unemployed, then subsidising unemployment
may lead to higher unemployment levels and be counterproductive.
We investigated the relative eﬃciency of employed versus unemployed job search using
unique data from a panel survey of low-skilled job seekers in Australia. These individuals are of
particular interest because they are often the focus of policies targeted towards the unemployed.
Unlike other standard data sets, our data provide information about both accepted and rejected
job oﬀers. Using a semi-structural estimation model, we found that job-oﬀer arrival rates in
employment and unemployment are not significantly diﬀerent: our point estimates for the ratio
at which job oﬀers attached to a certain wage arrive in employment versus unemployment range
from 0.7 to 0.99, which in no case are significantly diﬀerent from 1.
In this respect, the Australian labour market is like that of Northern Europe where un-
employed job search is less or equally eﬃcient, and unlike the United States where there are
eﬃciency gains to searching while unemployed. Unemployment benefits in Australia, therefore,
have no eﬀect on the eﬃciency of job search, but rather serve a redistributive function. This
24
finding lends empirical support to the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model and others like it,
which allow for employed job search and assume the job-oﬀer arrival rate in employment to be
equal to that in unemployment.
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Appendix 1
Results from the Fixed-Eﬀect Reduced Form Estimations
Table A.1 presents the reduced-form, fixed-eﬀect analyses of wages and reservation wages.
These first diﬀerence models shed light on the variation in wages and reservation wages across
time and individual characteristics. Note how the low standard deviation in reservation wage
changes (0.039) compares to the much larger standard deviation in the levels of reservation
wages (about 0.3), implying that over 90 per cent of the variation in reservation levels is due
to constant individual-specific factors.
Table A.1: Fixed-eﬀect Analyses of Starting Wages w˜it and Reservation Wages φ˜it
Using the Australian SEUP Data
4 ln w˜it 4 ln φ˜it
Variables coef. t-val coef. t-val
Individual characteristics:
intercept 0.022 1.4 -0.011 0.9
4t 0.00011 2.8 0.00015 3.8
first employment spell -0.07 0.6
currently employed 0.035 1.8
current unemployment duration -0.000023 1.2
cumulative unemployment duration 0.00013 2.5 -0.000011 0.4
current employment duration 0.00007 4.1 0.000035 0.9
(cum. unem.dur.)*(30≤age<40) -0.00014 3.0 -0.00011 2.1
(cum. unem.dur.)*(40≤age<50) -0.00015 2.7 -0.000002 0.0
(cum. unem.dur.)*(50≤age<60) -0.00016 2.2 -0.00012 1.9
σm,φ 0.039
Number of observations 5267 3713
Number of individuals 1892 1576
R2 0.02 0.02
The other available time-varying regressors were: previous wage, duration of last employment/unemployment
spell, part-time studying, # children, have a partner, disability, hours of work,education levels, and urban hous-
ing. The shown specification includes the most relevant and significant variables: none of the other variables
added significantly to the explained variance.
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